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10. CONTRACT LAW 
LEE Pey Woan 
LLB (Hons) (London), BCL (Oxford); 
Barrister (Middle Temple), Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor, Singapore Management University, School of Law. 
THAM Chee Ho 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL (Oxford); 
Solicitor (England and Wales), Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore),  
Attorney and Counsellor-at-Law (New York State); 
Associate Professor, Singapore Management University, School of Law. 
Formation of contract 
Offer and acceptance 
10.1 It is trite law that a contract may be concluded by conduct, and 
in such cases the precise point at which consensus ad idem occurs is 
essentially a question of fact. In Singh Chiranjeev v Joseph Mathew 
[2008] SGHC 222, the High Court held that an owner of a 
condominium unit was bound by his consent to an option agreement 
once he had accepted the deposit of the option moneys into his bank 
account. Not being made “subject to contract”, it was irrelevant that the 
option agreement had not been signed at that point. 
10.2 In contrast, an attempt to infer a contract from the parties’ 
conduct failed in Sitt Tatt Bhd v Goh Tai Hock [2008] SGHC 220. Here, 
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, the sole director and shareholder 
of Prime International Consultants Pty Ltd (“Prime”), had by his 
conduct contracted with the plaintiff to procure Prime to fulfil its 
various undertakings to the plaintiff. In substance, the plaintiff argued 
that such inference was justified because Prime, being an artificial entity, 
would not be in the position to discharge any of its responsibilities 
except through the defendant, its alter ego. As such, the defendant must 
be taken have accepted personal responsibility for Prime’s obligations. 
Judith Prakash J had no difficulty in dismissing these arguments. On the 
evidence adduced, it was clear that the plaintiff was at all material times 
aware that it was dealing with the defendant as the representative of 
Prime. The recognition that the defendant was factually responsible for 
Prime’s discharge of its contractual obligations could not lead to the 
implication of a direct contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. 
If the plaintiff ’s arguments were right, it would “have the potential to 
impose liability by way of a collateral contract between the directors 
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who control any company and third parties who contract with the 
company” (at [29]), which was plainly unacceptable. 
10.3 In Econ Piling Pte Ltd v NCC International AB [2008] SGHC 26, 
the High Court was asked to determine if two partners had, over a 
period of protracted negotiations, entered into a binding agreement to 
dissolve the partnership. Chan Seng Onn J emphasised that the issue 
was to be determined by an objective assessment of the parties’ conduct 
in the course of the negotiations as well as the surrounding 
circumstances. Where the evidence demonstrated that the parties had 
reached agreement on the material terms of dissolution, the parties were 
bound even if one partner subsequently refused or neglected to execute 
the deed of dissolution setting out the terms of the agreement. In such 
circumstances, the failure to execute the deed was only an 
incompleteness in form but not substance. 
Consideration 
10.4 Various aspects of formation issues arose in relation to 
compromises in Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Tie Terrence Peter [2009] 
SGCA 3. In this case, the appellant claimed the beneficial ownership of 
1.55 million ordinary shares (“the GLS shares”) in the capital of a 
company known as Gay Lip Seng & Sons (Pte) Ltd (“GLS”) and various 
remedies in consequence of the respondent’s alleged breach of trusts. 
10.5 The parties had been close friends for over 30 years. The 
respondent, Loh, was the managing director and shareholder of a 
company known as ASP Co Ltd (“ASP”) operating in Nairobi, Kenya. 
The appellant, Gay, joined ASP as its general manager in 1981 and had 
continued in its employment until 2004. In 1994, Gay subscribed for the 
GLS shares using funds provided by Loh. A trust deed was subsequently 
executed, under which Gay undertook to hold the GLS shares on trust 
for Loh. 
10.6 At the trial, Loh claimed that he had extended the subscription 
moneys to the appellant as an investment in GLS, and was therefore the 
beneficial owner of the GLS shares. Gay, however, argued that the 
moneys were a loan from Loh and the trust was created as security for 
the loan. As a subsidiary defence, Gay also contended that Loh’s rights in 
relation to the GLS shares had in fact been extinguished under a 
compromise agreement constituted by two documents, viz, a “points of 
agreement” dated 27 October 2004 (“POA”) under which Loh agreed to 
sell his entire stake in GLS to Gay for a sum of $1.5m; and a letter of 
waiver signed on the same day by Gay and Loh (in his capacity as 
managing director of ASP), pursuant to which Gay agreed to forego any 
claim for severance pay as against ASP. 
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10.7 Before the High Court (see Loh Sze Ti Peter v Gay Choon Ing 
[2008] SGHC 31), both parties accepted that the proper construction of 
the trust deed was central to the resolution of the dispute. Looked at in 
its entirety, Justice Belinda Ang concluded that the trust deed created an 
express trust in favour of Loh, who was therefore the beneficial owner of 
the GLS shares. Significantly, Ang J also rejected Gay’s “subsidiary” 
argument that the POA and waiver letter resulted in a binding 
compromise on three grounds.  
10.8 First, no compromise had arisen because the POA and waiver 
letter were two independent transactions binding different parties. 
While the POA dealt with the rights and liabilities of Loh and Gay, the 
waiver letter was concerned with Gay’s claims against ASP. Even though 
Loh was a signatory to the waiver letter, he did so in his capacity as 
managing director of ASP and there was no evidence to suggest that Loh 
was the alter ego of ASP. Second, even if it was accepted that the parties 
had entered into a compromise, the POA was, nevertheless, tainted by 
the breach of the fair-dealing rule and hence liable to be rescinded. 
Finally, Gay’s own assertions for severance pay after the execution of the 
POA and the waver letter amounted to clear evidence of there being no 
concluded compromise. 
10.9 In the Court of Appeal, however, the analysis of the issues took a 
decided turn. For the appeal court, the crux of the issue laid in the legal 
effects of the POA and the waiver letter rather than the legal status of 
the trust deed. Contrary to the findings in the court below, the Court of 
Appeal found that a valid compromise agreement had arisen by virtue 
of the contemporaneous execution of the POA and the waiver 
document. Taken together, the two documents had the effect of 
releasing Gay from all his obligations under the trust deed, while Loh 
was released from any obligation relating to the payment of severance 
fees to Gay. In effect, the settlement put an end to both parties’ claims, 
and Loh’s interests in the GLS shares, which had been lawfully sold to 
Gay under the terms of the POA, had to fail. 
10.10 Delivering the judgment of the court, Justice of Appeal Andrew 
Phang took the opportunity to clarify the law on compromises and 
settlements. Compromises, the learned judge observed (Gay Choon Ing v 
Loh Sze Tie Terrence Peter [2009] SGCA 3 at [45]), are predicated on 
there being a pre-existing dispute. Once it is clear that the parties are 
negotiating to settle a dispute, the question whether a binding 
compromise arises will be determined by applying the general principles 
of contract law. These would, of course, include the usual principles 
relating to offer, acceptance, consideration and intention to create legal 
relations. 
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10.11 In the High Court, one of the reasons cited for invalidating the 
compromise agreement was that the POA and the waiver letter bound 
different parties. In particular, whilst Loh relinquished his rights under 
the trust deed, he appeared to have derived no direct benefit in Gay’s 
promise to forego his claims for severance pay against ASP. However, the 
Court of Appeal did not regard this as an insuperable difficulty. 
10.12 As Andrew Phang JA explained (Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Tie 
Terrence Peter [2009] SGCA 3 at [78]–[79]), the more critical issues 
raised by these facts were whether the parties intended to create a 
binding compromise, and whether there was adequate consideration to 
support their respective promises. Both questions were answered in the 
affirmative. In particular, the court was satisfied that Gay had given 
adequate consideration for Loh’s promises under the POA because Gay’s 
promise to waive his claims against ASP was given at the request of Loh. 
Loh’s request crucially demonstrated that the POA and the waiver were 
part and parcel of one compromise rather than two unrelated 
transactions. 
10.13 Although Andrew Phang JA emphasised (Gay Choon Ing v Loh 
Sze Tie Terrence Peter [2009] SGCA 3 at [81]) that consideration could 
take the form of either detriment to the promisor or benefit for the 
promise, the signing of the waiver letter fulfilled both conditions. Loh 
clearly had a personal interest in ensuring that Gay gave up his claims 
against ASP and to that extent, Gay’s promise conferred a benefit on Loh 
inasmuch as it was a detriment to Gay. Thus viewed through the lens of 
contract law, the parties’ conduct amounted to a settlement which, 
having been fully executed, had the effect of extinguishing their prior 
claims and liabilities. (For another case decided on similar grounds, see 
Tsu Soo Sin v Ng Yee Hoon [2008] SGHC 30, where an attempt to 
invalidate an agreement on the ground of lack of consideration failed 
because the plaintiff ’s promise was in fact given in exchange for the 
other parties’ promises to confer benefits on third parties.) 
10.14 Apart from analysing the specific facts and issues arising in Gay 
Choon Ing v Loh Sze Tie Terrence Peter [2009] SGCA 3, Andrew Phang JA 
also commented broadly on the conceptual and doctrinal difficulties 
surrounding the contractual formation rules. One such comment 
related to Lord Denning’s suggestion (in Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v 
Ex-Cell-O Corp (England) Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 401) to substitute the rigid 
adherence to offer and acceptance rules with a more fluid approach that 
focuses on the finding of agreement on material points. 
10.15 Whilst acknowledging that the traditional application of 
formation rules do, on occasion, result in excessive technicality and 
artificiality, Andrew Phang JA was, nevertheless, of the view that Lord 
Denning’s approach was too radical (Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Tie 
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Terrence Peter [2009] SGCA 3 at [62]). For the Court of Appeal, the 
defects of the traditional approach could be cured by, “a less mechanistic 
and dogmatic application of these [offer and acceptance] concepts and 
this [could] be achieved by having regard to the context in which the 
agreement was concluded” (at [63]). 
10.16 Andrew Phang JA also embarked on an extensive evaluation of 
the proposition that the doctrine of consideration is now a redundant 
tool that has outlived its function. In a meticulous account, Phang JA 
traced the root of this view to the English Court of Appeal decision in 
Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 512. 
Essentially, the learned judge acknowledged that by extending the 
notion of benefit beyond legal benefit to include factual or practical 
benefits, the decision in Williams had so enlarged the concept of 
consideration as to render it an ineffectual tool for limiting the types of 
enforceable agreements. In the ultimate analysis, however, Phang JA 
favoured the maintenance of the status quo. 
10.17 In the view of the Court of Appeal, the doctrine of 
consideration is, notwithstanding its weaknesses, an entrenched part of 
contract law in Singapore. Given that there is as yet no alternative that 
could satisfactorily replace it, the continued application of the doctrine 
buttressed by other concepts that perform a similar limiting function is 
perhaps the “most practical solution inasmuch as it will afford the courts 
a range of legal options to achieve a fair and just result in the case 
concerned” [emphasis in original]: Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Tie Terrence 
Peter [2009] SGCA 3 at [118]. This would mean, in practical terms, that 
a contract could rarely be invalidated for lack of consideration. 
10.18 Indeed, a telling illustration of the breadth of the concept may 
be observed in Teo Seng Kee Bob v Arianecorp Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1135, 
where Justice Lai Siu Chiu held (applying Williams v Roffey Bros & 
Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 512) that an agreement to 
vary a contract was supported by consideration because the promisor 
had received part payment of the original consideration price at the 
time of the variation. The use of the moneys so received undoubtedly 
conferred a factual benefit on the promisor. By parity of reasoning, 
however, the same could be said of almost every part performance of the 
original undertaking. 
10.19 The decision in Gay Choon Ing v Loh Sze Tie Terrence Peter 
[2009] SGCA 3 is also an interesting illustration of the complications 
that may arise when legal and equitable doctrines collide. In reaching its 
conclusion, the Court of Appeal did not explicitly articulate the 
relevance, if any, of the High Court’s findings on Gay’s breaches of trust. 
A couple of alternative inferences may be drawn from the approach 
taken by the court. 
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10.20 The first is to understand the compromise as having effectively 
put an end to the trust. But this does not explain why the compromise 
agreement (and not merely the POA) was not itself tainted by Gay’s 
breach of the fair-dealing rule. The argument could conceivably be 
(though it appeared not to have been) made that Gay, in “purchasing” a 
release from his duties as trustee, was subject to the usual strictures of 
trusteeship. A plausible answer to this argument is to understand the 
compromise as comprising a termination of the trust followed by the 
transfer of non-trust assets. On this analysis, the trustee (Gay) would, by 
reason of the prior termination, have been freed from his trustee duties 
in his subsequent dealing with the assets. 
10.21 The alternative view is that implicit in the Court of Appeal’s 
approach is the assumption that the legal status of the trust (and the 
alleged breaches of trust) was irrelevant to the ultimate resolution of the 
dispute. Once it was established that the parties had intended to enter 
into a compromise, the legal effect of the transactions fell entirely within 
the province of contract. The parties’ precise legal positions prior to the 
compromise were inconsequential because those were the very subject 
matter of the parties’ dispute and of their eventual compromise. 
Formalities 
10.22 The formality requirements applicable to the enforcement of 
property transactions under s 6(d) of the Civil Law Act (Cap 43, 
1999 Rev Ed) were considered in Singh Chiranjeev v Joseph Mathew 
[2008] SGHC 222 (see para 10.1 above on “Offer and acceptance”). In 
this case, Justice Andrew Ang held that the requirements for a written 
memorandum under that provision were satisfied by a number of 
emails that should be read together as a chain of correspondence. It did 
not matter that some of the emails containing the terms of the 
agreement did not emanate from the seller so long as the emails 
contained all the material terms of the agreement. In that connection, it 
was noted that the relevant property was not clearly identified in the 
emails. However, the full address of the property was in fact written on 
the back of the cheque issued by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant, 
and this was found to be sufficient for the purposes of s 6(d). 
The terms of the contract 
Construction of terms 
10.23 While the Court of Appeal has in the recent decision of Zurich 
Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction 
Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 (see para 10.36 on “Parol evidence rule”) put 
it beyond all doubt that the contextual approach to the interpretation of 
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contracts is here to stay, this next case is a poignant illustration of the 
difficulties or, more specifically, the uncertainty that could be generated 
by such an approach. 
10.24 In Yamashita Tetsuo v See Hup Seng Ltd [2008] SGCA 49, the 
respondent company, See Hup Seng Ltd (“the company”), was on the 
brink of insolvency in 2003. Fortunately, it succeeded in persuading 
Meadow Springs Enterprises Ltd (“Meadow Springs”) to come to its 
rescue through the injection of fresh capital. Under the rescue plan, 
Meadow Springs agreed, inter alia, to acquire the equity stake held by 
SHS Holdings (Pte) Ltd (“SHSH”), then one of the company’s major 
shareholders, at $0.0475 per share. In addition, Meadow Springs also 
requested that the company enter into a deed of settlement to 
restructure the debts that the company owed to SHSH. 
10.25 Under the deed, the loan owing to SHSH was split into two 
loans comprising $1,773,337.50 (“warrant liability amount”) and 
$2,270,000 (“SHSH convertible loan”). Clause 3 of the deed provided 
that the warrant liability amount could be applied to pay for the exercise 
of certain warrants to subscribe for shares in the company at $0.11 per 
share. Clause 4.1 further provided that any portion of the warrant 
liability amount that had not been applied towards the exercise of the 
warrants shall be deemed to be discharged at the end of seven months 
from the date of the deed. The SHSH convertible loan, on the other 
hand, was to be repaid through a combination of cash and issue of new 
shares by the company (and hence the “convertible” feature). The critical 
provisions, being the subject matter of the parties’ dispute, were as follows 
(as set out in Yamashita Tetsuo v See Hup Seng Ltd [2008] SGCA 49 
at [11]: 
5.1 The SHSH Convertible Loan is interest-free … 
5.2 Subject to [c]lause 5.3 below, 75% of the SHSH Convertible Loan 
shall be repaid in cash on the Repayment Date. 
5.3 In the event [that] the Company is unable to obtain all relevant 
approvals for the Conversion Feature or SHSH is unable to exercise the 
Conversion Feature by reason of such Conversion Feature not being 
valid or enforceable or otherwise not in full force and effect for any 
reason whatsoever, the SHSH Convertible Loan, 100% of the SHSH 
Convertible Loan shall be repaid in cash on the Repayment Date. 
5.4 … 
5.5 Subject to clause 5.6 below, the SHSH Convertible Loan shall have 
a conversion feature (‘Conversion Feature’) whereby SHSH may, but 
shall not be obliged to, at any time and from time to time from the 
date of this Deed up to and including the Repayment Date, convert the 
SHSH Convertible Loan in whole or in part into Shares subject to the 
following terms: 
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(a) … 
(b) each exercise of such right will be by way of a Conversion Notice 
by SHSH to the Company, provided that: 
(i) … 
(ii) … 
(iii) …; and 
(iv) in the event [that] less than 25% of the SHSH 
Convertible Loan has been converted into Shares as at the 
Repayment Date (the difference between 25% of the SHSH 
Convertible Loan and the actual amount of [the] SHSH 
Convertible Loan converted into Shares [is] to be referred to 
as [the] ‘Shortfall Conversion Amount’), a Conversion Notice 
is deemed to be served on the Repayment Date to convert the 
Shortfall Conversion Amount into Shares on the terms of this 
clause 5 … 
[emphasis in original] 
10.26 Subsequent to the execution of the deed, SHSH was placed in 
liquidation. Its assets were distributed between its two shareholders, one 
Thomas Lim (“Lim”) and Linguafranca. The latter then assigned its 
rights to its share of the SHSH convertible loan (amounting to some 
$473,238.40) to the appellant. 
10.27 The issue before the court concerned the correct interpretation 
of cl 5.2 of the deed. As a preliminary point, both parties were agreed 
that cl 5.5(b)(iv) imposed an obligation on the appellant to apply at 
least 25% of the SHSH convertible loan (“the minimum conversion 
amount”) towards the acquisition of the company shares. Assuming that 
a portion equal to or exceeding the minimum conversion amount had 
already been applied to acquire the company’s shares, the question that 
then arose was whether the company was obliged, under cl 5.2, to 
repayment of 100% of the outstanding balance, or merely 75% of the 
same? 
10.28 Arguing for the latter, the company submitted that cl 5.2 ought 
to be construed as having incorporated a 25% discount or “haircut” and 
this discount was justifiable as the consideration that SHSH had agreed 
to pay to the company in exchange for the latter’s agreement to the 
conversion feature of the restructured loan. In response, the appellant 
pointed to the lack of commercial sense in such an arrangement. Having 
already given numerous other indulgences under the terms of the deed, 
there was no reasonable basis for assuming that SHSH would have 
agreed to a pay an additional price for the conversion feature. 
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10.29 A majority of the Court of Appeal (comprising Justices of 
Appeal V K Rajah and Andrew Phang) favoured the interpretation 
proffered by the appellant, ie, that the company was liable to repay the 
full balance outstanding. Taking a contextual approach to the 
construction of the deed, the majority judges emphasised (Yamashita 
Tetsuo v See Hup Seng Ltd [2008] SGCA 49 at [77] and [86]) that cl 5.2 
should be construed in the context of cl 5 as a whole. 
10.30 On the face of cl 5.2, although the words, “75% of the SSH 
convertible loan” suggested that the company would, in all 
circumstances, be liable to repay 75% of the full amount of the original 
loan, resulting in overpayment where more than the minimum 
conversion amount had already been converted into shares, the majority 
pointed out that such a construction was untenable. This was because 
cl 5.5(a) expressly stipulated that any part of the SHSH convertible loan 
that had been converted into shares would forthwith be “deemed fully 
and effectually repaid”. Thus, a more sensible interpretation of cl 5.2 
would be to confine its terms to one specific situation, viz, where exactly 
the minimum conversion amount has been converted. In other 
situations, the company’s liability to repay would have to be determined 
by discerning the schema derived from all the provisions in cl 5. 
10.31 Reading cl 5 as a whole, the majority then summed up its effects 
as follows (Yamashita Tetsuo v See Hup Seng Ltd [2008] SGCA 49 
at [89]): 
(a) If exactly the … Minimum Conversion Amount has been 
converted into Shares …, the [Company] must repay in cash 75% of 
the [SHSH Convertible Loan] … (see cl 5.2). 
(b) If more than the Minimum Conversion Amount has been 
converted into Shares …, the respondent must repay in cash 75% of 
the [SHSH Convertible Loan] less whatever part of that sum which has 
already been converted into Shares (see cl 5.2 read with cl 5.5(a)) ... 
(c) If less than the Minimum Conversion Amount has been converted 
into Shares …, the difference between the Minimum Conversion 
Amount and the amount that has actually been converted into Shares 
will be deemed to have been converted into Shares, and (a) above will 
apply (see cl 5.2 read with cl 5.5(b)(iv)). In other words, the 
respondent will repay in cash exactly 75% of the [SHSH Convertible 
Loan]. 
10.32 Although both the majority and minority judges placed 
considerable weight on the textual analyses of cl 5 of the deed, 
intriguingly, the critical point of difference lay in the judges’ respective 
assessment of the commercial context of the transactions. The majority 
emphasised (Yamashita Tetsuo v See Hup Seng Ltd [2008] SGCA 49 
at [100]–[108]) the lack of commercial sense in the suggestion that SHSH 
had agreed to a 25% haircut as a price for the conversion feature, or as a 
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disincentive for non-conversion. In particular, the majority noted that 
although the company (through Meadow Springs) was in a stronger 
bargaining position vis-à-vis SHSH, the terms of the deed ought not to 
be, “construed in a manner so oppressive that, when viewed objectively, 
it would be difficult to conceive of any reasonable party in SHSH’s 
position agreeing to those terms” (at [100]). Taking into account the 
delay in repayment of the loan, the concession represented by the 
repayment of minimum conversion amount in the form of shares rather 
than in cash, and the uncertain outlook for the company’s business, it 
was commercially unrealistic that SHSH could have agreed to pay a large 
premium for the convertibility feature. Given that the company’s 
interpretation was, from an objective point of view, commercially 
unreasonable, such an interpretation could only be upheld if it had been 
provided for in explicit and unambiguous terms. 
10.33 In dissent, Chao Hick Tin JA adopted the company’s 
interpretation of cl 5 and, more importantly, considered that such an 
interpretation was fully justifiable by the circumstances then prevailing. 
Given the company’s financial troubles at that time, SHSH’s loans were 
effectively bad debts. In light of that, Chao JA regarded it as “plain that 
the aim behind the arrangement set out in the deed was to ensure that, 
as far as possible, all the funds which SHSH had already put into the 
company, whether as capital or by way of loans, should remain in the 
company and be applied towards the rescue plan instead of being given 
back in cash to SHSH” (Yamashita Tetsuo v See Hup Seng Ltd [2008] 
SGCA 49 at [38]). The interpretation of cl 5.2 as imposing a 25% 
haircut on the outstanding and unconverted loan as a price for the 
conversion feature, or as an incentive to SHSH to convert the whole of 
the loan into shares was, therefore, fully consonant with this general 
aim. In reaching this view, Chao JA was obviously also influenced 
(at [21] and [37]) by the consideration that the parties involved were 
business entities which were fully appreciative of the consequences of 
their bargain. With that in mind, the appellant’s argument would 
(as Chao JA’s reasoning implicitly suggests) tread too close to inviting 
the court to rewrite the parties’ bargain based on its own sense of 
fairness or reasonableness. 
10.34 While it was clear from the facts in Yamashita Tetsuo v See Hup 
Seng Ltd [2008] SGCA 49 that the contract could not have been 
interpreted without recourse to the general commercial context, the 
divergent views of the majority and minority judges very neatly 
illustrate the resultant uncertainty that invariably confronts litigants in 
such cases. Admittedly, the commercial reasonableness of the 
transactions is, as the majority judges thought it to be, a relevant 
consideration for the inference of the parties’ objective intention. On the 
other hand, it is not at all clear when such assessment might cross into 
the impermissible path of re-writing bargains. 
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10.35 For another case in which the contextual approach was applied, 
see Uzbekistan Airways v Jetspeed Travel Pte Ltd [2009] 1 SLR 1. 
Parol evidence rule 
10.36 The extent to which extrinsic evidence may be admitted to 
affect the interpretation of contractual terms was the subject of an 
impeccably scrupulous and penetrating analysis by the Court of Appeal 
in Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & 
Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029. 
10.37 The respondent in this case (“B-Gold”) had contracted to carry 
out certain maintenance and repair works for Mediacorp Pte Ltd 
(“Mediacorp”). Under the contract, B-Gold was obliged, under cl 18 of 
the contract to “ensure that there [are] in force policies of insurance 
indemnifying MediaCorp, the Contractor and all subcontractors against 
damage to persons and property, for Workmen’s Compensation and 
fire”: Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & 
Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 at [9]. For this purpose, B-Gold 
purchased a Contractors’ All Risk Policy (“the policy”) from the 
appellants (“Zurich Insurance”) through the assistance of its usual 
agent, one Willy Lee, who was then in the employ of the American 
International Group. B-Gold’s subcontractor negligently caused a fire at 
the premises where repairs were to be effected, causing extensive damage 
to Mediacorp’s property. Mediacorp successfully brought a suit against 
B-Gold claiming compensation for the damage sustained. Thereafter, 
B-Gold commenced the present third-party action against Zurich 
Insurance, seeking an indemnity under the policy against all sums which 
it was liable to pay to Mediacorp. The strength of B-Gold’s claim turned, 
naturally, on the correct meaning and effect to be ascribed to the terms 
of the policy. 
10.38 Although the interpretative issues concerned various terms of 
the policy, a substantial portion of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning was 
directed at the High Court’s treatment of special exclusion 4(b) to 
Section II of the policy (“special exclusion 4(b)”), which excluded 
liability incurred in respect of (Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v 
B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 at [20]): 
loss of or damage to property belonging to or held in care, custody or 
control of the Contractor(s), the Principal(s) [including Mediacorp] or 
any other firm connected with the project which or part of which is 
insured under Section I, or an employee or workman of one of the 
aforesaid … [emphasis added] 
10.39 In the District Court, the district judge took the straightforward 
view that since the damaged property belonged to Mediacorp, B-Gold’s 
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claim fell squarely within the ambit of the exclusion. This holding was, 
however, reversed on appeal to the High Court. In that decision (B-Gold 
Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd v Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte 
Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 82), Justice Andrew Ang accepted (at [47]) that a 
literal construction of special exclusion 4(b) would render it applicable 
to B-Gold’s claim but concluded, after due consideration of the policy’s 
genesis, that the exclusion was unjust and inoperable. 
10.40 Andrew Ang J reasoned that since B-Gold had purchased the 
policy for the specific purpose of complying with cl 18 of the contract 
with Mediacorp, such purpose having been made known to the insurer, 
it would be “contrary to all sense of justice and fair play” (B-Gold 
Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd v Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte 
Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 82 at [56]) to give effect to a standard printed 
exclusion clause which has the effect of denying the very cover that B-Gold 
had required. In Ang J’s view (B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte 
Ltd v Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 82 at [59]), the 
operation of such a clause would lead to “absurdity” and the court was 
in such circumstance obliged to intervene to deny its efficacy. The Court 
of Appeal disagreed. In its view, the judge’s interpretation was flawed 
because it was essentially influenced by the improper use of extrinsic 
evidence. Recognising that there is a wider public interest to be served in 
clarifying an area of law that is often perceived as “obfuscated, obscure 
and opaque” (Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior 
Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 at [3]), the Court of 
Appeal set out on a meticulous and exhaustive review of the law relating 
to the parol evidence rule. 
10.41 Delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Justice of 
Appeal V K Rajah restated the common understanding of the parol 
evidence rule in these terms (Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold 
Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 at [40]): 
Where a contract has been determined by the court to contain all the 
terms of the parties’ agreement, no extrinsic evidence is admissible to 
vary the terms of that document. 
10.42 Despite its plainly intelligible terms, the application of the rule 
in the context of contractual construction is problematic. Particular 
tension has arisen, as V K Rajah JA explained (Zurich Insurance 
(Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd 
[2008] 3 SLR 1029 at [46] and [62]), because of the growing acceptance 
of the legitimacy of referencing extrinsic evidence to aid in the proper 
interpretation of contractual documents. Conceptually, of course, 
a marked distinction could be drawn between “contradicting, varying, 
adding to, or subtracting from” (at [44]) the contract – the very mischief 
at which the parol evidence rule is aimed – and that of interpretation, 
the process of ascribing one of several possible meanings to a term. 
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10.43 Where extrinsic evidence is admitted to clarify the meaning of a 
term, it would not ordinarily offend the parol evidence rule. In so far as 
the meaning ascribed is one that the text of the term could properly 
bear, the term is merely explained, not varied. To a large extent, this 
distinction has been preserved by the traditional (and more restrictive) 
approach to the interpretation of documents. Under this approach, the 
parties’ intention is objectively discerned from the natural and ordinary 
meaning of the language employed by the parties. If the words used bear 
a clear meaning, there is no question of employing extrinsic evidence to 
prove that the parties had intended a different meaning. Resort to 
extrinsic materials will only be permitted where some doubt or 
uncertainty resides in the text of the agreement. In other words, 
“ambiguity, absurdity or the existence of an alternative technical 
meaning is ostensibly a prerequisite for the court’s journey outside the 
contract towards its external context” [emphasis in original]: Zurich 
Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction 
Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 at [52]. 
10.44 But this approach is, as V K Rajah JA observed (at [52]) 
unsatisfactory because, while it permits recourse to extrinsic evidence to 
resolve latent ambiguity, it may be impossible to detect such ambiguity 
without first having had access to the extrinsic materials. The learned 
judge thus concluded that “in denying the role of extrinsic evidence in 
the interpretation of contracts, proponents of the traditional approach 
are only creating frustration, conflict and inconsistency” (at [52]). No 
doubt it is for reasons such as these that the common law has more 
recently shifted away from the traditional approach towards a 
“contextual” or “purposive” approach to contractual interpretation. But 
this development introduces new difficulties that require redress, not 
least of which is the risk of indiscriminate application, leading to the 
obliteration of the line between the interpretation and variation of a 
contractual term. 
10.45 In English law, the shift towards a “contextual approach” to 
contractual interpretation could be traced back to Lord Wilberforce’s 
speech in Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 and reached its high 
watermark in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich 
Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 (“Investors Compensation Scheme”). 
Essentially, this approach emphasises the importance of ascertaining the 
meaning of a contractual document against its background or factual 
matrix. As Lord Hoffmann explained in Investors Compensation Scheme, 
at 913: 
… the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words 
against the relevant background would reasonably have been 
understood to mean. The background may not merely enable the 
reasonable man to choose between the possible meanings of words 
which are ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary 
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life) to conclude that the parties must, for whatever reason, have used 
the wrong words or syntax … [emphasis added] 
10.46 In V K Rajah JA’s view (Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v 
B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 
at [62]), this new approach departs from the traditional approach in two 
ways. First, it has enlarged the scope of extrinsic materials that could be 
used for purposes of contractual interpretation. Second, and far more 
importantly, the new approach has abandoned the requirement for 
ambiguity as a prerequisite for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence. 
This means that extrinsic evidence may be admitted even where the text 
of a contract bears a clear and fixed meaning. In an extreme case, the 
court may even (at [62]): 
conclude that the ‘wrong words or syntax’ … have been used, ie the 
court may substitute what it deems to be the correct language or 
syntax for that used in the contract. 
10.47 Plainly, such a development has the effect of threatening the 
very rationale that underpins the parol evidence rule. But as we shall see 
(at para 10.48 below), the Court of Appeal, while fully appreciative of 
this tension, is ultimately satisfied that the context approach is the 
sensible way forward. 
10.48 For the position in Singapore, the Court of Appeal first turned 
to consider the scope and effect of ss 93–102 of the Evidence Act 
(Cap 97, 1997 Rev Ed). Of these provisions, s 94 and its proviso (f) were 
most germane to the issues before the court. In particular, the parol 
evidence rule is embodied by s 94, which essentially ensures that “where 
the sole evidence of a contract consists of ‘the document itself ’ 
(per s 93), that contract is not varied, contradicted, added to or 
subtracted from unless the circumstances described in one or more of 
the six accompanying provisos (ie, provisos (a)–(f) to s 94) are 
satisfied”: Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design 
& Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 at [71]. This primary 
prohibition in s 94 is, however, subject to proviso (f), which permits the 
proof of any fact “which shows in what manner the language of a 
document is related to existing facts”. Properly understood, proviso (f) is 
intended to encapsulate a rule of interpretation, and is not therefore 
(unlike provisos (a)–(e) to s 94) a true exception to s 94. In effect, the 
statutory framework does expressly permit, through proviso (f), the 
admission of extrinsic evidence to aid in the proper construction of 
contractual terms. But this logically leads to a more difficult question, 
ie, does proviso (f) import the traditional or the contextual approach? 
Put differently, is the proviso only applicable in instances that involve 
the resolution of “ambiguity”? 
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10.49 Upon a careful review of the relevant case law, the Court of 
Appeal answered the last mentioned question in the negative: Zurich 
Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction 
Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 at [114] and [121]. Notwithstanding the 
more restrictive view evinced in earlier cases, eg, Citicorp Investment 
Bank (Singapore) Ltd v Wee Ah Kee [1997] 2 SLR 759 and North Eastern 
Railway Co v Lord Hastings [1900] AC 260, the discernible trend in a 
series of more recent cases (Standard Chartered Bank v Neocorp 
International Ltd [2005] 2 SLR 345, China Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte 
Ltd v Liberty Insurance Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR 509, Singapore 
Telecommunications Ltd v Starhub Cable Vision Ltd [2006] 2 SLR 195 
and Sandar Aung v Parkway Hospitals Singapore Pte Ltd [2007] 
2 SLR 891) is to endorse the broader contextual approach, ie, to allow 
the admission of extrinsic evidence in aid of contractual construction 
even if there is no ambiguity on the face of the contract. This shift 
towards the contextual approach is, in the view of the court, one that 
“accords with common sense and logic” (Zurich Insurance (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 
3 SLR 1029 at [133]). From this, it must follow that “proviso (f) to s 94 
should be given a permissive interpretation which does not make 
ambiguity a prerequisite for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in aid 
of contractual interpretation”: Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v 
B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 
at [114]. 
10.50 But this does not mean that the notion of ambiguity is 
altogether irrelevant. On the contrary, “ambiguity still plays an 
important role, in that the court can only place on the relevant 
contractual word, phrase or term an interpretation which is different 
from that to be ascribed by its plain language if a consideration of the 
context of the contract leads to the conclusion that the word, phrase or 
term in question may take on two or more possible meanings, ie, if there 
is latent ambiguity” [emphasis added]: Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte 
Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 
at [108]. In affirming the contextual approach, the Court of Appeal was 
at all material times cognisant of the risk of abuse. 
10.51 Foremost amongst its concerns is the risk of unbridled 
application that would erode the quality of certainty that is the essential 
hallmark of any mature system of law (see in this connection, 
V K Rajah JA’s observations in Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v 
B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 at [4], 
[58], [111] and [129]). Addressing this concern, Rajah JA reiterated 
(at [122]) that “the courts must remain ever vigilant to ensure that, in 
interpreting the contract, extrinsic evidence is only employed to 
illuminate the contractual language and not as a pretext to contradict or 
vary it.” More specifically, Rajah JA laid down the threshold condition 
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requiring the court to be satisfied that a particular context is “clear and 
obvious” (at [129]) before it could adopt an interpretation that deviates 
from that suggested by the plain language of the contract. And here, 
indeed, lay the weakness of the High Court’s reasoning in the present 
case. 
10.52 Reviewing the evidence, the Court of Appeal found that the 
circumstances in which the policy was obtained was neither clear nor 
obvious (Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design 
& Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 1029 at [135]) because the precise 
communications that took place between Lee (B-Gold’s agent) and 
Zurich Insurance’s representative were obscure. In these circumstances, 
it was impermissible for the judge to allow the genesis of the policy to 
affect the interpretation of its terms. By altogether ignoring the effect of 
the exclusion clause, the High Court judge was not merely interpreting 
the clause but had “strayed far into the realm of varying a contract in 
contravention of s 94” [emphasis in original]: Zurich Insurance 
(Singapore) Pte Ltd v B-Gold Interior Design & Construction Pte Ltd 
[2008] 3 SLR 1029 at [134]. 
10.53 Finally, V K Rajah JA usefully summarised the principles 
governing the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to aid in the 
construction of contractual documents. Because of their importance, 
this summary is reproduced (sans references) below: 
(a) A court should take into account the essence and 
attributes of the document being examined. The court’s 
treatment of extrinsic evidence at various stages of the 
analytical process may differ depending on the nature of the 
document. In general, the court ought to be more reluctant to 
allow extrinsic evidence to affect standard form contracts and 
commercial documents. 
(b) If the court is satisfied that the parties intended to 
embody their entire agreement in a written contract, no 
extrinsic evidence is admissible to contradict, vary, add to, or 
subtract from its terms (see ss 93–94 of the Evidence Act). In 
determining whether the parties so intended, our courts may 
look at extrinsic evidence and apply the normal objective test, 
subject to a rebuttable presumption that a contract which is 
complete on its face was intended to contain all the terms of the 
parties’ agreement. In other words, where a contract is complete 
on its face, the language of the contract constitutes prima facie 
proof of the parties’ intentions. 
(c) Extrinsic evidence is admissible under proviso (f) to 
s 94 to aid in the interpretation of the written words. Our courts 
now adopt, via this proviso, the modern contextual approach to 
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interpretation, in line with the developments in England in this 
area of the law to date. Crucially, ambiguity is not a prerequisite 
for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence under proviso (f) to 
s 94. 
(d) The extrinsic evidence in question is admissible so long 
as it is relevant, reasonably available to all the contracting 
parties and relates to a clear or obvious context. However, the 
principle of objectively ascertaining contractual intention(s) 
remains paramount. Thus, the extrinsic evidence must always 
go towards proof of what the parties, from an objective 
viewpoint, ultimately agreed upon. Further, where extrinsic 
evidence in the form of prior negotiations and subsequent 
conduct is concerned, we find the views expressed in McMeel’s 
article and Nicholls’ article persuasive. For this reason, there 
should be no absolute or rigid prohibition against evidence of 
previous negotiations or subsequent conduct, although, in the 
normal case, such evidence is likely to be inadmissible for non-
compliance with the requirements [as regards relevance, 
reasonable availability and a clear and obvious context]. (We 
should add that the relevance of subsequent conduct remains a 
controversial and evolving topic that will require more extensive 
scrutiny by this court at a more appropriate juncture.) 
Declarations of subjective intent remain inadmissible except for 
the purpose of giving meaning to terms which have been 
determined to be latently ambiguous. 
(e) In some cases, the extrinsic evidence in question leads 
to possible alternative interpretations of the written words 
(ie, the court determines that latent ambiguity exists). A court 
may give effect to these alternative interpretations, always 
bearing in mind s 94 of the Evidence Act. In arriving at the 
ultimate interpretation of the words to be construed, the court 
may take into account subjective declarations of intent. 
Furthermore, the normal canons of interpretation apply in 
conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act, 
ie, ss 95–100. 
(f) A court should always be careful to ensure that extrinsic 
evidence is used to explain and illuminate the written words, 
and not to contradict or vary them. Where the court concludes 
that the parties have used the wrong words, rectification may be 
a more appropriate remedy. 
10.54 It was, however, reiterated in Ground & Sharp Protection 
Engineering Pte Ltd v Midview Realty Pte Ltd [2008] SGHC 160 at [22] 
that, “[t]he holding in Zurich Insurance that ambiguity is not a 
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prerequisite for the admissibility of extrinsic evidence does not change 
the fundamental rule that a contract is to be interpreted objectively.” 
10.55 In that case, a plaintiff had negotiated with the defendant for 
the option to purchase certain units of a factory (“the units”) but the 
option was only set out in a non-binding letter of intent that was made 
“subject to contract”. Subsequently, the parties entered into binding 
offer letters and formal tenancy agreements in respect of the units but 
neither set of document incorporated the option to purchase. In these 
circumstances, Justice Judith Prakash held that the absence of a term 
providing for the option in the offer letters and tenancy agreement was 
conclusive in excluding the option to purchase. The plaintiff was thus 
unsuccessful in its attempt to enforce a term by reference to extrinsic 
evidence (ie, the letter of intent). 
10.56 In Wong Lai Keen v Allgreen Properties Ltd [2009] 1 SLR 148, the 
High Court reiterated the general principle that the court will not lightly 
imply a term into a contract, but will only do so if such implication is 
necessary to give business efficacy to an agreement. This case was 
concerned with the collective sale of Regent Garden Condominium 
(“the property”). Briefly stated, a majority of subsidiary proprietors 
making up over 80% of the share value of the property agreed to sell it 
to Allgreen Properties Ltd (“Allgreen”). The minority subsidiary 
proprietors of the remaining six units initially opposed the sale and 
lodged their objections with the Strata Titles Board (“STB”). 
Subsequently, however, Allgreen successfully persuaded the minority 
proprietors to withdraw their objections and to consent to the sale by 
promising them an additional payment over and above the amount due 
to them under the collective agreement. In the meantime, the majority 
owners had discovered that they had overestimated the development 
charge payable on the property, the implication of which was that they 
could have sold it for a higher price. The majority then sought to 
terminate or rescind the collective sale on various grounds. One of the 
arguments raised by the majority was that there should be implied in 
the collective sale agreement a term that prohibits Allgreen from making 
additional payments to the proprietors on a selective basis. This 
argument was rejected by the High Court. Justice Lee Seiu Kin held that 
there was no basis for implying such a term since the collective sale 
agreement was perfectly capable of being performed without such a 
term being implied. (See also Lim Quee Choo v Tan Jin Sin [2008] 
SGHC 133, where the High Court also declined to imply a term into a 
contract that was neither necessary nor reasonable). 
Conditions subsequent 
10.57 In Ong Chay Tong & Sons (Pte) Ltd v Ong Hoo Eng [2009] 
1 SLR 305, the appellant had conveyed a property to the respondent 
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subject to the latter’s undertaking to dispose of the same to only his 
lineal male descendants. It was also stipulated that the appellant would, 
upon the breach of this undertaking, be entitled to repossess the 
property at the price of $100,000. 
10.58 In considering whether this undertaking amounted to a 
condition subsequent to the original conveyance, the Court of Appeal 
observed (Ong Chay Tong & Sons (Pte) Ltd v Ong Hoo Eng [2009] 
1 SLR 305 at [44]) that “the classic hallmark of a condition subsequent 
is that a breach of it would accord the grantee the right to bring the 
original contract to an end or to re-enter or forfeit the property.” In the 
court’s view, the undertaking was in the nature of a contractual 
restraint, and not a condition subsequent. This is because the provision 
of the appellant’s right to repossess did not involve the cessation or 
rescission of the original grant. Thus, the original conveyance would not 
be affected by the breach of the undertaking but the appellant would be 
entitled to damages or (where the allegedly infringing disposition of the 
property was not yet complete) to seek an injunction against its 
alienation. 
Indemnity clauses 
10.59 In CST Cleaning & Trading Pte Ltd v National Parks Board 
[2009] 1 SLR 55, the High Court had the occasion to revisit the 
principles governing the interpretation of indemnity clauses in relation 
to liability for negligence. The appellant was a contractor 
(“the contractor”) engaged by the respondent, National Parks Board 
(“the board”), to provide cleaning services at Pasir Ris Park. On 
5 December 1999, a young boy, one Liew, cycling on a footpath at the 
park had collided with a lorry driven by one Ang, an employee of the 
contractor’s subcontractor (“the subcontractor”).  
10.60 In a suit commenced by Liew in the Magistrates Court, the 
magistrate found the board and the subcontractor to be jointly liable for 
Liew’s injuries, and apportioned liability at 50% each. The board paid 
the entire damages due to Liew pursuant to the magistrate’s judgment 
and then commenced the present action to seek an indemnification 
from the contractor under cl 22(a) of its contract with the contractor: 
The Contractor shall be liable for and shall indemnify the Board in 
respect of any liability, loss, claim or proceedings whatsoever arising 
under any statute or common law in respect of personal injury to or 
death of any person whomsoever arising out of or in the course of or 
by reason of the execution of the Works provided that the same is due 
to any negligence, omission or default of the Contractor, his servants or 
agents or any subcontractor, his servants or agents. [emphasis in 
original] 
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10.61 The dispute between the parties turned essentially on the 
interpretation of the proviso to this clause. The contractor contended 
that cl 22(a) was intended to indemnify the board only in respect of any 
vicarious liability for the contractor’s or his subcontractors’ negligence. 
it therefore had no application to the present case, where the board was 
itself negligent. The board, on the other hand, argued that its claim fell 
squarely within the text of the proviso to cl 22(a) because its liability was 
caused by the negligence of the contractor’s subcontractor. 
10.62 In its analysis, the High Court identified two principles relevant 
to the interpretation of indemnity clauses. The first, which it termed 
“the ‘inherently improbable’ principle of construction”, states that 
“parties to a contract are not to be taken to have agreed that a party shall 
be relieved of the consequences of its negligence without the use of clear 
words showing that that was the intention of the contact” 
(per Hobhouse J in E E Caledonia Ltd v Orbit Valve Co Europe [1994] 
1 WLR 221 at 227). The second is the more familiar contra proferentum 
rule. 
10.63 Applying the “inherently improbable” principle, the essential 
question is whether the board had, through cl 22(a), succeeded in 
relieving itself from the consequences of its own negligence in clear 
terms. Chan Sek Keong CJ did not think the clause had achieved this 
purpose. In his view, cl 22(a) was drafted only to meet the specific 
situations where either the board or the contractor was wholly liable but 
not a case such as the present, where the parties were concurrently 
liable. That being the case, the issue could not be resolved “by reference 
to the technical issue of causation nor by trying to ferret the express 
intention of the parties since they had not … addressed their minds to a 
case of concurrent causes”: CST Cleaning & Trading Pte Ltd v National 
Parks Board [2009] 1 SLR 55 at [34]. In the face of such lacuna, the 
court would have to resort to other principles of construction to aid in 
its interpretation of the term. 
10.64 In this connection, Chan Sek Keong CJ did not (CST Cleaning 
& Trading Pte Ltd v National Parks Board [2009] 1 SLR 55 at [37]) 
regard the contra proferentum rule helpful because the interpretation of 
cl 22(a) against the board would require the court to altogether ignore 
the proviso to cl 22(a), and this the court could not do. More 
specifically, Chan CJ rejected (at [29]) the argument that the proviso 
was intended only to reinforce the “inherently improbable” principle of 
construction by confining the contractor’s liability to its own or its 
agent’s negligence. So understood, the proviso would be superfluous 
because the same result would have been achieved (without the proviso 
and) by simply relying on the “inherently improbable” principle. 
Instead, the court should approach the matter as “the commercial 
parties to the agreement would probably have approached it … to give 
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effect to the indemnity only to the extent that the Board itself is not at 
fault in causing injury to any person lawfully in the Park” [emphasis in 
original]: CST Cleaning & Trading Pte Ltd v National Parks Board [2009] 
1 SLR 55 at [37]. 
10.65 Such an approach, in Chan Sek Keong CJ’s view, would resolve 
the tension between the “inherently improbable” principle (which 
would not relieve the board of liability for its own negligence) and the 
proviso (which sought to impose indemnification liability on the 
contractor). Consequently, the contractor was ordered to indemnify the 
board to the extent of the subcontractor’s contributory negligence, 
ie, 50% of the board’s loss. 
Vitiating factors 
Duress 
10.66 In Holcim (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Kwan Yong Construction Pte Ltd 
[2008] SGHC 231, the defendant unsuccessfully argued for the vitiation 
of a varied contract on the ground of economic duress. This case 
concerned a contract entered into in August 2006, under which the 
plaintiff agreed to supply the defendant with ready-mix concrete. The 
defendant’s intention was to use the concrete in the rebuilding of a 
primary school under a contract awarded by the Ministry of Education 
(“MOE”). In January 2007, the Indonesian authorities unexpectedly 
imposed a ban on the export of sand to Singapore. This resulted, 
naturally, in the sharp increase in the prices of sand and aggregate 
(materials used in the manufacture of concrete). Accordingly, the 
plaintiff informed the defendant that it would not be able to continue to 
supply concrete except at the relevant increased prices. A number of 
deliveries were, in fact, accepted by the defendant on these new terms. 
Subsequently, however, the defendant refused to pay for various 
deliveries, alleging, amongst others, that it had agreed to the higher 
prices under economic duress. 
10.67 Whilst recognising (Holcim (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Kwan Yong 
Construction Pte Ltd [2008] SGHC 231 at [69]) that commercial 
pressure could constitute duress that could render a contract voidable, 
Justice Lai Siu Chiu held that the defendant had not proven that it was 
acting under such pressure. Applying the indicia of illegitimate pressure 
famously laid down by Lord Scarman in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1979] 
3 WLR 435 at 451, Lai J found that not only had Kwan Yang not 
protested against the price adjustments at the material times, it had in 
fact, by the placement of new orders, assented to the same. Until the 
institution of the present action by the plaintiff, the defendant had taken 
no legal steps to assert its claims. Further, it had also succeeded in 
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obtaining extensions of time from the project’s consultants and had not 
(at the time of the trial) been penalised by MOE in liquidated damages. 
It also did not help that the defendant was in the position to help the 
plaintiff in procuring the raw materials required for the manufacture of 
concrete but made no effort to do so. In these circumstances, the 
defence of economic duress appeared manifestly feeble. 
Mistake 
10.68 Another ground on which the majority proprietors sought to 
rescind the collective sale agreement in Wong Lai Keen v Allgreen 
Properties Ltd [2009] 1 SLR 148 (the facts of which are set out in 
para 10.56 under “Implied terms”) was that of common mistake. At the 
time of the agreement, the parties had proceeded on the basis that the 
estimated development charge would be in the region of $7.6m. As it 
turned out, however, the actual development charge was only $950,894. 
The majority proprietors thus claimed that the agreement had been 
vitiated by the parties’ common mistake as to the quantum of the 
development charge. 
10.69 Rejecting this argument, Lee Seiu Kin J held (at [40]–[41]) that 
no mistake could have arisen in this case because the parties were at all 
material times aware that the estimated development charge was merely 
an estimate. A contract would not be avoided for mistake if, on its true 
construction, the mistake relates to a risk which one of the parties had 
agreed to bear. Having deliberately decided not to make specific 
enquiries to ascertain the actual amount of the development charge, the 
majority owners had clearly assumed the risk that the actual 
development charge would be lower than the estimate. 
10.70 The discussion on common mistake is also noteworthy by 
reason of Lee Seiu Kin J’s reference (at [39]) to Great Peace Shipping Ltd 
v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2003] QB 679 (“The Great 
Peace”). It will be recalled that in The Great Peace, the English Court of 
Appeal had decided that the jurisdiction to set aside a contract on the 
ground of common mistake resided only in common law but not equity. 
This resulted, somewhat controversially, in the overrule of Solle v 
Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671. In Singapore, however, a different position 
appeared to have been adopted by the Court of Appeal in Chwee Kin 
Keong v Digilandmall [2005] 1 SLR 502, where equity’s more flexible 
jurisdiction was expressly preserved. Although the issue in Chwee Kin 
Keong related to unilateral rather than common mistakes, nevertheless, 
it is clear that the court’s reasons for not abandoning the equitable 
jurisdiction are applicable to both contexts. That being the case, it is 
uncertain whether or to what extent this aspect of the reasoning in 
The Great Peace is applicable in Singapore. 
234 SAL Annual Review (2008) 9 SAL Ann Rev 
 
Illegality 
10.71 In interlocutory proceedings for summary judgment dismissing 
the plaintiff ’s claim pursuant to O 14 r 12 of the Rules of Court 
(Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed) and/or striking out of the claim pursuant to 
O 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court, Andrew Ang J made some interesting 
observations as to the effect of bribery on the validity of a contract. In 
Sin Yong Contractor Pte Ltd v United Engineers (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
[2008] SGHC 43, the plaintiff company sought to recover sums unpaid 
under 53 invoices for installation of sprinkler systems for the defendant 
company. The defendant company resisted payment on the ground that 
the contract was tainted by illegality and was unenforceable. Prior to its 
corporatisation in 1999, the business of the plaintiff had been run as a 
sole proprietorship, the sole proprietor being one Tan King Hiang, who 
became a shareholder and director of the plaintiff from 1999. From 
1991 until 2003, Tan paid numerous bribes to one Lee Lip Hiong, the 
defendant’s engineering manager at the time, having the duty to 
negotiate, award, enter into and administer contracts with contractors 
and subcontractors such as the plaintiff. 
10.72 In reversing the decision of the registrar and dismissing both 
applications, Andrew Ang J rejected the proposition that the mere fact 
of bribery constituted fraud as would render the installation contracts to 
which the unpaid invoices pertained unenforceable. The learned judge 
also rejected the proposition that performance of the installation 
contracts was tainted by illegal performance and was, therefore, 
unenforceable. 
Assignment of choses in action 
10.73 Surprising as it may seem, until the Court of Appeal handed 
down its judgment in Tsu Soo Sin v Oei Tjiong Bin [2009] 1 SLR 529, the 
question as to whether the efficacy of an equitable assignment of a legal 
chose in action depended upon notice of the assignment having been 
given to the equitable assignee remained the subject of much legal 
uncertainty. So far as Singapore law is concerned, these doubts have now 
been expelled. 
10.74 In the clearest of pronouncements, V K Rajah JA, delivering the 
judgment of the court, held that such notice served only practical 
functions, important though they might be. The efficacy of an equitable 
assignment depended, however, on the actual intention of the assignor, 
as made manifest by an act of assignment of a clearly identified chose in 
action. Notice to the assignee is not required for the efficacy of the 
equitable assignment, although such assignment was subject to the 
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assignee’s right to disclaim the benefit of the chose assigned upon 
learning of it: Tsu Soo Sin v Oei Tjiong Bin [2009] 1 SLR 529 at [57]. 
Discharge of contract 
Frustration and force majeure 
10.75 The connection between the doctrines of frustration and force 
majeure was conclusively set out by the Court of Appeal in RDC 
Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 413 (“RDC”) 
discussed in (2007) 8 SAL Ann Rev 150 at 179–180, para 10.81). Inter 
alia, it was noted in RDC that where a contract was discharged by 
operation of a force majeure clause, it could not simultaneously be said 
to have been frustrated since the operation of the doctrine of force 
majeure would exclude the doctrine of frustration (at [60]). It appears 
that this important decision was not brought to the attention of the 
High Court in Holcim (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Kwan Yong Construction Pte 
Ltd [2008] SGHC 231 (“Holcim”; see para 10.66 above on “Duress”). 
Given the learned judge’s finding in Holcim that the subsequent 
agreement to vary the price payable for concrete was supported by valid 
consideration on application of the rule in Williams v Roffey Bros & 
Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1 (in that the defendant had 
avoided having to pay liquidated damages for delay on its part as a result 
of having the benefit of the continued supply of concrete, pursuant to 
the variation agreement: Holcim, at [81]) and that such variation 
agreement was not vitiated by duress (as discussed above at para 10.67), 
the judge’s comments on the issues of frustration and force majeure 
ought to be taken to be obiter dicta.  
10.76 On the question of frustration, the learned judge applied the 
test set out in Glahe International Expo AG v ACS Computer Pte Ltd 
[1999] 2 SLR 620. Even so, she held that on the facts before her, the 
imposition of the ban on sand exports by the Indonesian Government 
did, nevertheless, amount to a frustrating event. The learned judge said 
(Holcim (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Kwan Yong Construction Pte Ltd [2008] 
SGHC 231 at [77]): 
The premise for the performance of the contract evidenced in the 
Quotation was that the plaintiff would be able to obtain sand at the 
prices they had been paying ($11 – $12 per ton) to produce concrete. 
It also envisaged that the plaintiff would have a ready supply of sand at 
all times. The situation changed completely after the sand ban, that 
premise no longer held. Sand was no longer easily available or 
available at all, even if the plaintiff was willing to pay any price. … The 
plaintiff could no longer perform the contract because of the non-
availability of sand, an event outside its control and which caused it to 
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close down two plants. The contract evidenced in the Quotation was 
accordingly frustrated. 
10.77 Creating some slight difficulty, however, the learned judge 
proceeded to take the position that the contract between the parties 
contained a force majeure clause discharging the plaintiff from its 
obligation to supply concrete, and that “the sand ban would qualify as a 
force majeure” (Holcim (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Kwan Yong Construction Pte 
Ltd [2008] SGHC 231 at [84]). Regrettably, despite the conclusive 
statement of the law set out by the Court of Appeal in RDC Concrete Pte 
Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 413 as to the relationship 
between these two doctrines, the court did not explicitly make it clear 
that its views on force majeure (Holcim (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Kwan Yong 
Construction Pte Ltd [2008] SGHC 231 at [84]) were to be taken in the 
alternative to its views on frustration (at [77]). Given the weight of the 
authority of RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 
4 SLR 413, Holcim ought not to be taken as standing for any position 
contrary to that taken by the Court of Appeal in RDC. 
Remedies 
Remoteness and proof of damage 
10.78 The law of remoteness of damage in contract was extensively 
discussed by the Court of Appeal in Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v 
Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR 623. The appellant, Robertson 
Quay Investment Pte Ltd (“Robertson Quay”), engaged the respondent, 
Steen Consultants Pte Ltd (“Steen Consultants”), to provide civil and 
structural engineering services in the construction of a hotel that 
Robertson Quay owned and was developing (“Gallery Hotel”). In 
particular, Steen Consultants were to design, plan and supervise the 
structural works for the hotel. 
10.79 Due to a mistake, the wrong set of structural drawings was 
submitted to the building authorities and was subsequently used in the 
construction of the hotel. As a result, the hotel was structurally deficient 
and additional remedial and strengthening works were required, 
delaying its completion by 101 days. Robertson Quay sought damages 
against Steen Consultants for loss and damage suffered and expenses 
incurred as a result of the delay. Liability was admitted, and at first 
instance, the assistant registrar assessed Steen Consultants’ total liability 
to be $699,429.41, inclusive of $279,363.82 for interest on loans from 
Robertson Quay’s shareholders and other related parties (the 
“Shareholder Loans”), and $215,859.84 for interest on a term loan and 
an overdraft facility that Robertson Quay incurred during the delay 
(“the Loans”). Interest was also ordered on the total damages awarded at 
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6% per annum from the date of the service of the writ to judgment. The 
assistant registrar did not, however, award Robertson Quay damages for 
loss of rental income that might have been earned during the period of 
delay. 
10.80 On appeal to the High Court, that part of the assistant 
registrar’s award in relation to the interest on the Shareholder Loans and 
the Loans was set aside. Interest on the damages was also ordered to run 
from the date of service of the statement of claim instead of the date of 
service of the writ. The other parts of the assistant registrar’s assessment, 
including her dismissal of Robertson Quay’s claim for loss of rental 
income, were upheld. Limiting their appeal to the issue of damages for 
the interest on the Shareholder Loans and the Loans, Robertson Quay 
then lodged a further appeal. 
10.81 Before the Court of Appeal, the appellant took the position that 
it had suffered actual loss in the form of additional interest expenditure 
that it would not have incurred had there been no delay, and that this 
loss was not too remote as to be irrecoverable on the principles set out 
in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341; 165 ER 145. This, the Court of 
Appeal pointed out, entailed consideration of two issues. First, whether 
Robertson Quay had proved that it had incurred such additional interest 
as a result of the delay in completion of the hotel; and second, whether 
such additional interest was recoverable as damages in law: Robertson 
Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] SGCA 8; 
[2008] 2 SLR 623 at [24]. The former, it should be noted, pertains to the 
issue of causation of loss, whereas the second, the issue of its 
remoteness. 
10.82 The Court of Appeal pointed out that until causation of loss 
had been established, there was simply no need to discuss issues such as 
remoteness of loss or mitigation: Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v 
Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR 623 at [27]. Even so, there was no 
need to prove with complete certainty the exact amount of damage 
suffered: at [28]. However, a flexible approach was to be applied, 
depending on the circumstances of the case and the nature of the 
damage claimed. Devlin J’s observations in Biggin & Co Ld v Permanite, 
Ld [1951] 1 KB 422 at 438 were cited with approval (Robertson Quay 
Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR 623 at [30]): 
[Where] precise evidence is obtainable, the court naturally expects to 
have it. Where it is not, the court must do the best it can. 
10.83 Thus, although a plaintiff could not make a claim for damages 
without providing sufficient evidence of the loss suffered, the court 
ought to permit recovery so long as the plaintiff had attempted to do its 
level best to prove its loss and provided it had cogent evidence of such 
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loss: Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd 
[2008] 2 SLR 623 at [31]. 
10.84 The appellant’s case floundered on this point. Although it was 
able to show the sums of actual interest it had incurred and paid during 
the period of delay, the Court of Appeal noted that this evidence merely 
demonstrated the quantum of the alleged damage. It did not 
demonstrate that such damage was in fact suffered by the appellant as a 
result of the delay caused by the respondent. Indeed, even taking into 
consideration the accounting practice of interest capitalisation, the 
Court of Appeal noted that interest would still have been payable so 
long as the loans remained unpaid: Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v 
Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR 623 at [33]. 
10.85 To recover the additional interest paid, more was required of the 
appellant. First, although the facility agreement for the bank loan made 
it plain that the bank loan had been taken out for the purpose of 
financing the project, the agreements for the Shareholder Loans had not 
been produced before the court and there was no evidence that these 
loans or part thereof had been used to finance the project. 
Consequently, the court could not see how the appellant’s claim for 
interest incurred on the Shareholder Loans during the period of delay 
could succeed: Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants 
Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR 623 at [37]. Furthermore, although the bank loans 
were taken out to finance the project, part of these had been utilised to 
pay the interest incurred on the Shareholder Loans at [38]. 
10.86 Second, the respondent’s responsibility for the delay in the 
project did not necessarily or automatically lead to their being 
responsible for the additional interest incurred as a result of the delay. 
Such a conclusion could only be reached if it was proved to the court’s 
satisfaction that there was a factual link between the delay and the 
additional interest in question, and the mere payment of the interest by 
the appellant was insufficient to fix liability on the respondent, had the 
project been completed on time. For the Court of Appeal, given the facts 
of the case, the appellant ought to have gone further to prove that full or 
partial repayment of the loans would have been effected using the 
income generated from the operations of the hotel, had the project been 
completed on time. Mere assertion that such income would have been 
used to repay the loans was not enough. Rather, evidence that there was 
in existence an actual system of repaying the loans using operating 
income ought to have been produced in court: Robertson Quay 
Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR 623 at [39]. 
Alternatively, the appellant might have been able to recover for 
additional interest paid if it could demonstrate that interest rates on the 
loans had increased and/or it had had to borrow further sums, or had 
had to extend the period of the loans: at [40]. 
(2008) 9 SAL Ann Rev Contract Law 239 
 
10.87 Third, even if the appellant managed to demonstrate its 
intention to repay the loans, the Court of Appeal remained sceptical of 
its quantification of its loss. A claim for all of the additional interest 
incurred during the period of delay was only possible if the loans had 
been paid in full. But given the very substantial sums borrowed, the 
court found it highly unrealistic that the hotel would have, upon 
completion, instantaneously generated the necessary sums required to 
effect full repayment and the interest incurred to date: (Robertson Quay 
Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR 623 at [43]. 
10.88 Although the appeal was readily disposed of on the point of 
insufficient proof of causation and quantification of loss, the Court of 
Appeal also made a number of useful observations on the remoteness of 
loss. It accepted that, on balance, the remoteness rule set out in Hadley v 
Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341; 165 ER 145 retained both theoretical 
coherence and practical functionality (Robertson Quay Investment Pte 
Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR 623 at [53]), and that the 
rule in Hadley, as restated by Asquith LJ in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) 
Ld v Newman Industries Ld [1949] 2 KB 528, represented the law in 
Singapore on remoteness of contract: Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd 
v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR 623 at [55]. Though 
recognising that the rule was not perfect, the Court of Appeal helpfully 
clarified a number of points. 
10.89 First, that the criterion of “reasonable contemplation” applied to 
both “normal” loss as well as “unusual” loss under each of the limbs of 
the Hadley rule (Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341; 165 ER 145). 
The difference lay in the horizon of contemplation. For the first limb, 
the horizon of contemplation was confined to loss which arose naturally 
in the usual course of things and was, therefore, presumed to have been 
within the contemplation of the parties. For the second limb, the 
horizon of contemplation was extended to loss that did not occur in the 
usual course of things: Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen 
Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR 623 at [59]. 
10.90 The Court of Appeal also usefully highlighted that the criterion 
of “reasonable contemplation” of loss as used in connection with the 
remoteness rule in contract was not to be conflated with the criterion of 
“reasonably foreseeable” loss as commonly used in connection with 
remoteness of damages in tort. The difference between the two criteria 
of remoteness arose because the law of contract was about agreement: 
Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 
2 SLR 623 at [77]. Thus, it was held (at [79]) that, in its formulation of: 
… rules and principles that would apply universally to all contracting 
parties in situations where the contracting parties have not expressly 
provided, in advance, for what is to happen in the event of a breach of 
their respective contracts … the courts will bear in mind the fact that 
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the contracting parties did have the opportunity to communicate with 
each other in advance. The courts must, however, also be careful to 
ensure that the rules and principles formulated do not result in a 
rewriting of the contract in question … 
10.91 With this in mind, the Court of Appeal was of the view that 
third-party financing of the costs of construction in large commercial 
construction projects was inevitable in the present day and age and 
accordingly, “… the parties to such a project, as reasonable people, must 
be imputed with the knowledge that a delay in completion would 
certainly give rise to additional financing costs.” Indeed, the court could 
not see why additional interest incurred in large commercial 
construction projects due to late completion should not, in principle, be 
recoverable under the first limb of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 
9 Exch 341; 165 ER 145: Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen 
Consultants Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR 623 at [91]. Thus, but for the 
appellant’s failure to provide satisfactory proof of its loss in the form of 
additional interest payments made as a result of the delay in completion, 
such loss would have been recoverable under the first limb of the rule in 
Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341; 165 ER 145 as not being too 
remote: Robertson Quay Investment Pte Ltd v Steen Consultants Pte Ltd 
[2008] 2 SLR 623 at [94]. 
Assessment of damages for loss of amenity 
10.92 In Sonny Yap Boon Keng v Pacific Prince International Pte Ltd 
[2009] 1 SLR 385, the High Court was provided with an opportunity to 
revisit the dicta of Andrew Phang Boon Leong J (as he then was) in 
Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 
1 SLR 853 at 903–904 on the limits of relying on market rental value of a 
substitute property as a means to measure loss of use of property. 
10.93 The plaintiff, Mr Sonny Yap, had engaged the first defendant 
(“Pacific Prince”) to design and build a house on land owned by the 
plaintiff and his wife. Completion of the house was delayed by three 
months beyond the expressly stipulated date of completion. The 
plaintiff also alleged that the bedrooms constructed by the first 
defendant were not in compliance with the contract specifications and 
were too small. There were also other various breaches, but the parts of 
the judgment of greatest interest relate to these two matters. 
10.94 First, in relation to the assessment of damages for the plaintiff 
for the late completion, Judith Prakash J observed that it would not be 
correct to measure the loss caused to the plaintiff by the delay in 
completion by reference to the cost of renting similar premises in the 
vicinity since: (a) the plaintiff had not suffered any such loss – he had 
not rented any other accommodation in light of the delay, but had 
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merely continued to stay on in the flat he and his family had been 
residing in; and (b) the plaintiff had intended to live in the house to be 
constructed by the first defendant as his residential home. 
10.95 Taken together, these two reasons set out the basic principle that 
one may not recover for loss that one does not suffer. Given the former, 
it was plain that the plaintiff had not endured any loss by reference to 
the cost of renting alternative accommodation. Given the latter, it was 
also impossible for the plaintiff to assert that it had suffered any 
expectation loss by reference to the income he would have enjoyed by 
renting the property out. Had the house been constructed with a view to 
renting it out to generate income, on the expectation model of recovery, 
the plaintiff would have been entitled to assert that its inability to 
generate such income for the period occasioned by the first defendant’s 
delay in completing construction amounted to a loss caused by the first 
defendant’s breach of contract. But this was not the case. Rather, the 
plaintiff ’s loss in the circumstances pertained to the loss of income that 
might have been earned through renting out his existing flat, had the 
property been completed in accordance with the contract: Sonny Yap 
Boon Keng v Pacific Prince International Pte Ltd [2009] 1 SLR 385 
at [120]. However, as there was no evidence of this, Prakash J awarded 
the plaintiff nominal damages of $1,000 under this head. 
10.96 Second, Prakash J was concerned with the problem of the 
shortfall in the floor area of the bedrooms. In relation to this, the 
plaintiff had claimed for the cost of reconstructing the affected rooms. 
Noting the obvious parallel with the decision of the House of Lords in 
Ruxley Electronics and Construction v Forsyth [1995] 3 WLR 118, 
Prakash J held that, in the case before her, it was necessary to look at the 
entire contractual objective and not just the objective of the individual 
specifications in the contract, and that the entire objective was to 
construct a house that was suitable for the occupation of the plaintiff ’s 
family (Sonny Yap Boon Keng v Pacific Prince International Pte Ltd [2009] 
1 SLR 385 at [127]). In the judgment of the court, this objective had 
been met, even though the four bedrooms as constructed by the first 
defendant were measurably smaller in dimension than that desired by 
the plaintiff. Taking into consideration the original cost of building 
(being $736,400) and comparing that against the cost of reconstruction 
works (being $141,080) which would require extensive demolition 
rendering the house to be uninhabitable for the period of 
reconstruction, Prakash J accepted the first defendant’s submission that 
recovery of such cost of reconstruction would be unreasonable since his 
loss only pertained to the lack of space in the bedrooms. Though 
smaller than desired, leading to a loss of amenity to the plaintiff, they 
were still usable as bedrooms. 
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10.97 The question, then, was whether only nominal damages, too, 
ought to be awarded for the plaintiff ’s loss of amenity. Prakash J 
followed the position taken by Lord Bridge of Harwich and Lord Mustill 
in Ruxley Electronics and Construction v Forsyth [1995] 3 WLR 118, and 
held that the court was entitled to make an award to compensate the 
plaintiff for the loss of amenity arising from the shortfall in the floor 
area of the bedrooms, even though there was no evidence that such 
shortfall had had any adverse effect on the market value of the property, 
nor had there been any skimping or diminution in the value of the work 
done by the first defendant: Sonny Yap Boon Keng v Pacific Prince 
International Pte Ltd [2008] SGHC 161 at [129]. Taking into account the 
differing degrees to which the sizes of the bedrooms had fallen short, 
Prakash J assessed the plaintiff ’s loss of amenity to amount to $50,000, 
that being the sum “sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the 
inconvenience to be experienced from the shortfall over the years”: 
Sonny Yap Boon Keng v Pacific Prince International Pte Ltd [2009] 
1 SLR 385 at [128]. 
Quantum meruit 
10.98 Joining a line of Singapore cases ranging from Rabiah Bee bte 
Mohamed Ibrahim v Salem Ibrahim [2007] 2 SLR 655 to Lee Siong Kee v 
Beng Tiong Trading, Import and Export (1988) Pte Ltd [2000] 4 SLR 559, 
Woo Bih Li J in Yaku Shin (JB) Sdn Bhd v Panasonic AVC Networks 
Singapore Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 193 had occasion to repeat the point that 
there are two forms of quantum meruit: one, arising out of contractual 
agreement (“contractual quantum meruit”), and a second, arising out of 
unjust enrichment (“restitutionary unjust enrichment”), clarifying that 
though a contractual relationship was necessary for the former, the 
latter restitutionary unjust enrichment could be found in the absence of 
any contract: Yaku Shin (JB) Sdn Bhd v Panasonic AVC Networks 
Singapore Pte Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 193 at [79]–[81]. But, the presence of 
contractual liability could preclude the possibility of unjust enrichment, 
as was the case on the facts before him. 
10.99 Yaku Shin (JB) Sdn Bhd (“YKJB”) brought proceedings against 
Panasonic AVC Networks (“Panasonic”) on the basis of restitutionary 
quantum meruit for goods supplied to Panasonic. These goods had been 
ordered by Panasonic via an online procurement system, the orders 
being placed with Yaku Shin (M) Sdn Bhd (“YKM”), a company in 
common ownership with YKJB. Although the orders were indisputably 
placed with YKM, fabrication and delivery of the goods was effected by 
YKJB. Consequently, it was not possible for YKJB to succeed in its claim 
against Panasonic for restitutionary quantum meruit since Panasonic 
remained contractually liable to make payment to YKM, the entity with 
whom Panasonic’s orders had been placed and with whom it was in 
contractual relations with. Accordingly, at no point would Panasonic 
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have been unjustly enriched by its receipt of the goods fabricated by 
YKJB: Yaku Shin (JB) Sdn Bhd v Panasonic AVC Networks Singapore Pte 
Ltd [2008] 4 SLR 193 at [82]. 
Assessment of damages for fraudulent misrepresentation 
10.100 The long-running litigation over the ill-fated involvement of 
Wishing Star Ltd in the installation of the glass façade of the Biopolis 
developed by the Jurong Town Corporation has, it seems, finally come 
to an end. Having been found liable for fraudulent misrepresentation, 
the question of assessment of damages for that tort came for 
consideration before the Court of Appeal in Wishing Star Ltd v Jurong 
Town Corp [2008] 2 SLR 909. Though this case might be more 
appropriately dealt with in the section on tort, it is useful to mention 
this case within the present contractual context, if only to highlight the 
importance of keeping the very different bases of an award in contract 
for breach, as compared with an award in tort, distinct from each other. 
10.101 The salient facts were that the appellant, Wishing Star Ltd 
(“WSL”), had successfully tendered to design, supply, deliver and install 
curtain walling and cladding systems for the Biopolis project developed 
by the respondent, Jurong Town Corp (“JTC”). There was one bid, just 
marginally higher than WSL’s, but JTC had disregarded that bid as they 
had had poor experiences with that contractor in previous projects. The 
next highest bid to WSL’s bid of $54m was for $63,458,706. It transpired 
that WSL was not able to perform, as represented, and JTC undertook 
another tender exercise, eventually appointing a new contractor, Bovis 
Lend Lease (“BLL”) to complete the façade works pursuant to a new 
contract (the “BLL contract”), BLL having submitted the lowest bid in 
this exercise of $61.81m. 
10.102 Various heads of damage were claimed by JTC from WSL on 
account of their fraudulent misrepresentation, but only the following 
were allowed by the judge in the court below: 
(a) $7.81m, being the difference between the value of WSL’s 
bid and the value of BLL’s bid; 
(b) $18,223.97, being expenses incurred by JTC as a result 
of having to visit China to inspect WSL’s facilities; 
(c) $313,600, being expenses incurred by JTC as a result of 
having to attend to WSL during the time when it was seeking to 
perform its obligations under their contract with JTC; and 
(d) $8,000, being the costs of engaging a surveyor for 
inspecting WSL’s facilities in China. 
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Given that the victim of a fraudulent misrepresentation may 
recover all losses directly caused by the misrepresentation, the 
Court of Appeal agreed that, other than the first head of loss, 
ie, the $7.81m claimed as the difference between WSL’s bid and 
BLL’s bid, all the other heads of loss were rightly awarded and 
upheld the decision below. 
10.103 The difficulty with the claim for the $7.81m was, unfortunately, 
that it had not been demonstrated how this loss could be said to be 
directly caused by WSL’s misrepresentation. It had put in the lowest 
tender, and the next bid that might have been seriously considered by 
JTC, was for a sum in excess of $64m. On these premises, the Court of 
Appeal noted as follows (Wishing Star Ltd v Jurong Town Corp [2008] 
2 SLR 909 at [56]): 
What this scenario meant was that if WSL had never tendered for the 
contract for the façade works in the original tender exercise, JTC 
would have been left with Liang Huat’s bid as, in effect, the lowest bid 
that was available for acceptance … And, taking into account that the 
Project had to be completed on an urgent basis, it is reasonable to 
infer that JTC would have accepted Liang Huat’s bid instead of calling 
for new bids … 
10.104 Given the above, it was clear to the Court of Appeal that: 
(a) JTC could not have accepted any bid below that of 
Liang Huat’s which was in excess of $64m; and 
(b) the lowest bids leading to the appointment of BLL was 
that submitted by BLL (being in excess of $63m). 
10.105 As Lord Hoffmann had observed, obiter, in South Australia Asset 
Management Corp v York Montague [1997] AC 191 at 216, “[t]he 
defendant is clearly not liable for losses which the plaintiff would have 
suffered even if he had not entered into the transaction.” It was, 
therefore, not possible for JTC to maintain the argument that the 
difference between the value of the contracts entered by WSL and BLL 
with JTC, respectively, was loss that flowed directly from the transaction 
entered into as a result of WSL’s fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Accordingly, the $7.81m claimed under this head was disallowed. 
10.106 The result may seem surprising, given the plain finding of WSL’s 
deceit and the extensive liability one typically associates with liability 
under the tort of deceit which is the basis of recovery in a case of 
fraudulent misrepresentation. But this case reinforces the point that 
damages for tort are to place the victim of the tort in the position as if 
the tort had not occurred. And, had the tort not occurred, it was likely 
that JTC would have gone on to appoint another contractor who would, 
most likely, have charged JTC more than the $54m proposed by WSL. 
(2008) 9 SAL Ann Rev Contract Law 245 
 
Therefore, it was not possible to draw any connection between the $54m 
proposed by WSL in the original tender, and the price fixed in the BLL 
contract arising out of the subsequent tender exercises. There was, it 
seemed, a confusion between the contract and tort measures of 
damages, and the two, the court emphasised, ought not to be conflated: 
Wishing Star Ltd v Jurong Town Corp [2008] 2 SLR 909 at [43]. 
Damages on the “broad ground” 
10.107 The Court of Appeal has in Family Food Court v Seah Boon Lock 
[2008] 4 SLR 272 provided further guidance on the resolution of the 
problem of the infamous “black hole” encountered in cases where a 
contract entails performance for the benefit of a non-party. Usefully, it 
also considered the interaction between this quintessentially contract 
problem with the doctrine of undisclosed principals. 
10.108 This was an appeal from the decision of Andrew Ang J in Seah 
Boon Lock v Family Food Court [2007] 3 SLR 362. In this case, the first 
plaintiff had been licensed by the defendant to operate a food stall on 
the defendant’s premises. The first plaintiff sought to recover substantial 
damages when that licence was wrongfully terminated. The 
complication arose because he appeared to have been acting as agent of 
an undisclosed principal. Following the judgment handed down by the 
Court of Appeal, the following points now seem clear: 
(a) The “narrow ground” is only applicable in the context 
of a breach of contract where the third party to the contract has 
no contractual remedy to recover substantial damages against 
the contractual promisor (Family Food Court v Seah Boon Lock 
[2008] 4 SLR 272 at [47]), where it is in the contemplation of 
the contracting parties that the proprietary interest in the 
contractual subject matter may be transferred from one owner 
to another after the contract had been entered into but before 
the occurrence of any breach of contract: at [36], [40] and [58]. 
(b) The “narrow ground” is not rendered inapplicable by 
the availability to the third party of an alternative cause of 
action against the contractual promisor in tort: Family Food 
Court v Seah Boon Lock [2008] 4 SLR 272 at [47]. 
(c) Like the narrow ground, the broad ground applies only 
in the context of a breach of contract, though on the broad 
ground, the plaintiff would be recovering substantial damages 
for its own loss and not on behalf of the third party: Family 
Food Court v Seah Boon Lock [2008] 4 SLR 272 at [52]. 
(d) The broad ground was, however, constrained by an 
objective test of reasonableness as to the performance interest 
claimed so as to curb what would otherwise be a windfall 
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accruing to the plaintiff and to limit recovery only to instances 
where the performance interest claimed was genuine (at [53]). 
(e) Over and above the objective test of reasonableness 
applicable to the broad ground, and the element of 
contemplation or foreseeability required in the narrow ground, 
both the broad and narrow grounds continued to be subject to 
the traditional legal mechanisms for controlling recovery for 
breach of contract, to wit, the mechanisms pertaining to 
causation of loss, remoteness of damage, mitigation of loss and 
the requirement of certainty of loss; but the broad and narrow 
grounds did not correlate, respectively, to the first or second 
limbs of the rule in Hadley (at [55]). 
(f) The broad and narrow grounds were, however, 
conceptually inconsistent with each other and could not be 
applied simultaneously (at [56]). 
(g) Given the need for contemplation of transfer, the 
narrow ground is not applicable in a case where the third party 
is an undisclosed principal. It would not be possible to argue 
that the loss of the plaintiff/promisee was to be seen as the loss 
of the third party/principal since the third party/principal was 
undisclosed and the defendant/promisor would not have known 
of him: Family Food Court v Seah Boon Lock [2008] 4 SLR 272 
at [58]. 
